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I am writing in further response
to your letterofSeptember 17,
1973, which requested comments
on certain criticisms of monetary
policy overthe past year.
As stated in your letter, the
criticisms are: (1) "that there was
too much variation from time to
time in the rate of inctease in the
money supply, that monetary
policywas too erratic, too much
characterized by stops and
starts"; and (2) "thatthe money
supply had increased much too
much last year, in fact that the
increase would have been too
much even if we had been in the
depths ofa recession instead of
enjoying a fairly vigorous eco-
nomic expansion."
These criticisms involve basic
issues with regard to the role of
money in the economy, and the
role that the money supply
should play in the formulation
and execution of monetary
policy. These issues, along with
the specific points you raise,
require careful examination.
Criticism of Our Public Policies
During the past two years the
American economy has experi-
enced a substantial measureof
prosperity. Real output has
increased sharply, jobs have
been created for millions of
additional workers, and total
personal income-both in dollars
and in terms of real purchasing
power-has risen to the highest
levels ever reached.
Yet the prosperity has been a
troubled one. Price increases
have been large and widespread.
For a time, the unemployment
rate remained unduly high.
Interest rates have risen sharply
since the spring of 1972. Mort-
gage money has recently become
difficult to obtain in many
communities. And confidence in
the dollar at home and abroad
has at times wavered.
Many observers have blamed
these difficulties on the manage-
mentof public economic




1,1 ..to hold expendituresdown-
continued in substantial deficit.
There has also been an enormous
growth in the activities of Feder-
ally-sponsored agencies which,
although technicallyoutside the
budget, must still be financed.
The results ofefforts to control
wages and prices duringthe past
year have been disappointing.
Partial decontrol in early 1973
and the subsequentfreeze failed
to bringthe results thatwere
hoped for.
Monetary policy has been
criticized on somewhat contra-
dictorycounts-for being
inflationary, orfor permittingtoo
high a level of interest rates, or
forfailing to bring the economy
backtofull employment, orfor
permitting excessive short-term
variations in the growth ofthe
money supply, and so on.
One indication ofdissatisfaction
with our public policies was
provided by a report, to which
you refer in your letter, on a
questionnaire surveyconducted
by the National Association of
Business Economists. Ofthe
responents, 38 percent rated
fiscal policy "overthe pastyear"
as "poor"; 41 percent rated
monetary policy "overthe past
year" as "poor"; and only 14 per-
centfelt thatthe wage-price
controls under Phase IV were
"about right." If this sampling is
4
at all indicative, the public
policies on which we have relied
are beingwidely questioned.
Many members ofthe above
group, in fact, went on record for
a significant change in fiscal
policy. In response to a question
whethertheyfavored a variable
investment tax credit, 46.5 per-
centsaid "yes",40 percent said
"no" and 13.5 percent
expressed "noopinion."
Let me now turn to the questions
raised in your letterand in some
other recent discussions about
monetary policy. Ishall discuss,
in particular, the role of money
supply in the conductof
monetary policy; the extent and
significance ofvariability in the
growth ofthe money supply;
and the actual behavior ofthe
money supply during 1972-73.
Role of Money Supply
For many years economists have
debated the role of the money
supply in the performance of
economic systems. One school
ofthought, often termed "mone-
tarist," claims that changes in the
money supply influence very
importantly, perhaps even
decisively, the pace ofeconomic
activity and the level of prices.
Monetarists contend thatthe
monetaryauthorities should pay
principal attention to the money
supply, rather than to other
financial variables such as
interest rates, in the conductof
monetary policy. They also
contend that fiscal policy has
only a small independent impact
on the economy.
Anotherschool ofthought places
less emphasis on the money
supply and assigns more im-
portanceto the expenditure and
tax policies ofthe Federal
Government as factors influenc-
ing real economic activity and
the level of prices. This school
emphasizes the need for
monetary policy to be concerned
with interest rates and with
conditions in the money and
capital markets. Some economic
activities, particularly residential
building and State and local
government construction,
depend heavily on borrowed
funds, and are therefore influ-
enced greatly by changes in the
cost and availability ofcredit. In
other categories ofspending-
such as business investment in
fixed capital and inventories, and
consumerpurchases of durable
goods-credit conditions playa
less decisive role, but they are
nonetheless important.Monetarists recognize that
monetary policy affects private
spending in part through its
impact on interest rates and other
credit terms. But they believe
that primary attention to the
growth ofthe money supply will
result in a more appropriate
monetary policy than would
attention to conditions in the
credit markets.
Needless to say, monetary policy
is-and has long been-a con-
troversial subject. Even the
monetarists do not speak with
one voice on monetarypolicy.
Some influential monetarists
believe that monetary policy
should aim strictly at maintaining
a constant rate ofgrowth ofthe
money supply. However, what
that constant should be, or how
broadly the money supply should
be defined, are matters on which
monetarists still differ. And there
are also monetarists who would
allowsome-but infrequent-
changes in the rate ofgrowth of
the money supply, in accordance
with changing economic
conditions.
It seems self-evident that
adherence to a rigid growth rate
rule, or even one that is changed
infrequently, would practically
prevent monetary policyfrom
playing an active role in eco-
nomic stabilization. Monetarists
recognize this. They believe that
most economic disturbances
tend to be self-correcting, and
they therefore argue that a
constant or nearly constant rate
ofgrowth ofthe money supply
would result in reasonably
satisfactory economic perform-
ance.
But neither historical evidence,
northethrust of explorations in
business-cycle theory over a long
century, give support to the
notion that oureconomy is
inherentlystable. On the
contrary, experience has demon-
strated repeatedly that blind
reliance on the self-correcting
properties ofoureconomic
system can lead to serious
trouble. Discretionary economic
policy, while it has at times led
to mistakes, has more often
proved reasonably successful.
The disappearance of business
depressions, which in earlier
5times spelled mass unemploy-
ment for workers and mass
bankruptcies for businessmen, is
largely attributable to the
stabilization policies ofthe last
thirty years.
The fact is thatthe internal
workings ofa market economy
tend ofthemselves to generate
business fluctuations, and most
modern economists recognize
this. For example, improved
prospects for profits often spur
unsustainable bursts of invest-
ment spending. The flow of
personal income in an age of
affluence allows ample latitude
for changes in discretionary
expenditures and in savings rates.
During a business-cycle
expansion various imbalances
tend to develop within the
economy-between aggregate
inventories and sales, or between
aggregate business investment in
fixed capital and consumer
outlays, or between average unit
costs of production and prices.
Such imbalances give rise to
cyclical movements in the
economy. Flexible fiscal and
monetary policies, therefore, are
often needed to copewith
undesirable economic develop-
ments, and this need is not
diminished by the fact that our




There is general agreement
among economists that, as a rule,
the effects ofstabilization
policies occur gradually over
time, and that economic
forecasts are an essential tool of
policy making. However, no
economist-orschool of
economics-has a monopoly on
accurate forecasting. At times,
forecasts based largelyon the
money supply have turned out
to be satisfactory. At othertimes,
such forecasts have been quite
poor, mainly because of un-
anticipated changes in the
intensity with which the existing
money stock is used by business
firms and consumers.
Changes in the rate ofturnover
of money have historically played
a large role in economic
fluctuations, and they continue
to do so. For example, the
narrowly-defined moneystock-
that is, demand deposits plus
currency in public circulation-
grew by 5.7 percent between
the fourth quarterof1969 and
the fourth quarterof 1970. But
the turnoverof money declined
during thatyear, and the dollar
value ofGNP rose only4.5 per-
cent. In thefollowing year, the
growth rate ofthe money supply
increased to 6.9 percent, but
the turnover of money picked
up briskly and the dollarvalue
ofGNP accelerated to 9.3 per-
cent. The movement out of
recession in 1970 into recovery
in 1971 was thus closely related
to the greater intensity in the use
of money. Occurrences such as
this are very common because
thewillingness to use the existing
stock of money, expressed in its
rate ofturnover, is a highly
dynamicforce in economic life.
For this as well as other reasons,
the Federal Reserve uses a blend
offorecasting techniques. The
behavior ofthe money supply
and otherfinancial variables is
accorded careful attention. So
are the results of the most recent
surveys on plant and equipment
spending, consumer attitudes,
and inventory plans. Recent It
trends in key producing and
spendingsectors are analyzed.
The opinions of businessmen
and outside economic analysts
are canvassed, in part through
the nationwide contacts of Feder-
al Reserve Banks. And an assess-
ment is made ofthe probable
course offiscal policy, also of
labor-marketand agricultural
policies, and their effects on the
economy.
Evidence from all these sources is
weighed. Efforts are also made to ~ I
assess economic developments
through the use of large-scaleeconometric models. An eclectic
approach is thus taken by the
Federal Reserve, in recognition
ofthe fact that the state of
economic knowledge does not
justify reliance on any single
forecasting technique. As
economic research has cumu-
lated, it has become increasingly
clear that money does indeed
matter. But other financial
variables also matter.
In recent years, the Federal
Reserve has placed somewhat
more emphasis on achieving
desired growth rates ofthe
monetary aggregates, including
the narrowly-defined money
supply, in its conduct of
monetary policy. But we have
continued to give careful
attention to other financial
indicators, among them the level
of interest rates on mortgages
and other loans and the liquidity
position of financial institutions
and the general public. This is
necessary because the economic
implications of any given
monetary growth rate depend on
the state of liquidity, the attitudes
of businessmen, investors, and
consumers toward liquidity, the
cost and availability of borro\Ned
funds, and other factors. Also,
as the nation's central bank, the
Federal Reserve can never lose
sight of its role as a lenderof last
resort, so that financial crises and
panics will be averted.
I recognize that one advantage
of maintaining a relatively stable
growth rate of the money supply
is that a partial offset is thereby
provided to unexpected and
undesired shifts in the aggregate
demand for goods and services.
There is always some uncertainty
as to the emerging strength of
aggregate demand. If money
growth is maintained at a rather
stable rate, and aggregate
demand turns outto be weaker
than is consistent with the
nation's economic objectives,
interest rates will tend to decline
and the easing of credit markets
should help to moderate the
undesired weakness in demand.
Similarly, ifthe demand for
goods and services threatens to
outrun productive capacity, a
rather stable rate of monetary
growth will provide a restraining
influence on the supply ofcredit
and thus tend to restrain
excessive spending.
However, it would be unwise for
monetary policy to aim at all
times at a constant or nearly
constant rate ofgrowth of money
balances. The money growth
rate that can contribute most to
national objectives will vary with
economic conditions. For
example, ifthe aggregate
demand for goods and services
is unusually weak, or ifthe
demand for liquidity is unusually
strong, a rate of increase in the
money supply well above the
desirable long-term trend may
be needed for a time. Again,
when the economy is experienc-
ing severe cost-push inflation, a
monetary growth rate that is
relatively high by a historical
yardstick may have to be
tolerated for a time. Ifmoney
growth were severely constrained
in orderto combat the element
of inflation resulting from such a
cause, it might well have
seriously adverse effects on
production and employment. In
short, what growth rate ofthe
money supply is appropriate at
any given time cannot be
determined simply by extrapolat-
ing past trends or by some
preconceived arithmetical
standard.
Moreover, for purposes of
conducting monetary policy, it is
never safe to rely on just one
concept of money-even ifthat
concept happens to be fashion-
able. A varietyof plausible
concepts merit careful attention,
because a numberof financial
assets serve as a convenient,
safe, and liquid store of
purchasing power.
7The Federal Reserve publishes
data corresponding to three
definitions of money, and takes
all ofthem into account in
determining policy. The three
measures are: (a) the narrowly-
defined money stock (M1), which
encompasses currency and
demand deposits held by the
nonbank public; (b) a more
broadly-defined money stock
(M2), which also includes time
and savings deposits at com-
mercial banks (other than large
negotiable time certificates of
deposit); (c) astill broader
definition (M3), which includes
savings deposits at mutual
savings banks and savings and
loan associations. A definition
embracing other liquid assets
could also bejustified-for
example, one that would
include large-denomination
negotiable time certificates of
deposit, U.s. savings bonds and
Treasury bills, commercial
8
paper, and other short-term
money market instruments.
There are many assets closely
related to cash, and the public
can switch readily among these
assets. However money may be
defined, the task of determining
the amount of money needed to
maintain high employment and
reasonable stability of the general
price level is complicated by
shifting preferences of the




In the short run, the rate of
change in the observed money
supply is quite erratic, and
cannot be trusted as an indicator
of the course of monetary
policy. This would be so even
ifthere were no errors of
measurement.
The record of hearings held by
the Joint Economic Committee
on June 27,1973 includes a
memorandum which I sub-
mitted on problems encountered
in controlling the money supply.
As indicated there, week-to-
week, month-to-month, and
even quarter-to-quarter
fluctuations in the rate ofchange
of money balances are frequently
influenced by international
flows of funds, changes in the
level of U.S. Government
deposits, and sudden changes
in the public's attitude towards
liquidity. Some of these varia-
tions appearto be essentially
random-a product of the
enormous ebb and flow offunds
in our modern economy.
Because the demands of the
public for money are subject to
ratherwide short-term variations,
efforts by the Federal Reserve to
maintain a constant growth rate
of the money supply could lead
to sharp short-run swings in
interest rates and risk damage to
financial markets and the econ-
omy. Uncertainties about
financing costs could reduce
the fluidity of markets and in-
crease the costs of financing to
borrowers. In addition, wide and
erratic movements of interest
rates and financial conditions
could have undesirable effects
on business and consumer
I,
I
a monthly rise or fall in the
money stock ofeven $2112 billion
would amount to only a1 per-
cent change. But when such a
temporary change is expressed
as an annual rate, as is now
commonly done, itcomes out as
about 12 percent and attracts
attention far beyond its real
significance.
The Federal Reserve research
staff has investigated carefully
the economic implications of
variability in M I growth. The ex-
perience of the past two decades
suggests that even an abnor-
mally large or abnormally
small rate of growth ofthe
money stock over a period up to
six months or so has a negligible
influence on the course ofthe
economy-provided it is subse-
quently offset. Such short-run
variations in the rate ofchange in
money supply may not at all
reflect Federal Reserve policy,
and they do not justify the atten-
tion they often receive from
financial analysts.
The thrust ofmonetarypolicy and
its probable effects on economic
activity can only be determined
byobserving the course ofthe
moneysupplyand ofother mone-
tary aggregates over periods
lasting six months or so. Even
then, care must be taken to
measure the growth of money
balances in ways that temper the
9 -------------11.
Table 1
DEVIATIONS IN M I FROM ITS
AVERAGE RATE OF GROWTH
1970 THRU MID-1973







Some indication of the extent of
short-term variations in the re-
corded money supply is provided
below. Table 1 shows the average
and maximum deviations (with-
out regard to sign) of M I from
its average annual growth rate
over athree and a halfyear
period. As would be expected, the
degree ofvariation diminishes as
the time unit lengthens; it is
much larger for monthly than for
quarterly data, and is also larger






In our judgment, there need be
little reason for concern about
the short-run variations that
occur in the rate ofchange in the
money stock. Such variations
have minimal effects on the real
economy. For one thing,the
outstanding supply of money is
very large. It is also quite stable,
even when the short-run rate of
change is unstable. This October
the average outstanding supply
of MIl seasonally adjusted, was
about $264 billion. On this base,
In any event, for avariety of
reasons explained in the
memorandum for the Joint
Economic Committee, to which I
have previously referred, the
Federal Reserve does not have
precise control over the money
supply. To give one example, a
significant part of the money
supply consists ofdeposits
lodged in nonmember banks that
are not subject to the reserve
requirements set by the Federal
Reserve. As a result there is some
slippage in monetary control.
Furthermore, since deposits at
nonmember banks have been
reported for onlytwo to four
days in ayear, in contrast to
daily statistics for member banks,
the data on the moneysupply-
which we regularly present on a
weekly, monthly, and quarterly
basis-are estimates rather than
precise measurements. When the
infrequent reports from non-
member banks become available,
they often necessitate consider-
able revisions ofthe money
supply figures. In the past two
years, the revisions were upward,
and this may happen again
this year.
spending. These adverse effects
may not be of majordimensions,
but it is betterto avoid them. •influenceofshort-term varia-
tions. For example, the growth of
money balances over a quarter
can be measured from the
amount outstanding in the last
month ofthe preceding quarter
to the last month ofthe current
quarter, or from the average
amount outstandingduringthe
preceding quarterto the average
in the current quarter. The first
measure captures the latest
tendencies in the money supply,
but may be distorted by random
changes that have no lasting
significance. The second measure
tends to average outtemporary
fluctuations and is comparable to
the data provided on a wide
range ofnon-monetary economic
variables, such as the gross
national product and related
measures.
A comparison of these two ways
of measuring the rate ofgrowth
in M 1 is shown in Table 2 for
successive quarters in 1972 and
1973. The first column, labeled
M, shows annual rates calculated
from end-months of quarters;
the second column, labeled Q,
shows annual rates calculated
from quarterly averages.
Table 2
GROWTH RATES OF MONEY
SUPPLY ON TWO BASES
Annual Rate of Change,
in percent
M Q




1973 I 1.7 4.7
II 10.3 6.9
III 0.3 5.1
As may be seen, the quarterly
averages disclose much more
clearly the developingtrend of
monetary restraint-which, in
fact, began in the second quarter
of1972. Also, the growth of Ml1
which on a month-end basis
appears very erratic in the first
three quarters of 1973, is much
more stable on a quarterly
average basis. For example,
whi1e the level of M 1 did not
expand significantly between
june and September, the
quarterlyaverage figures indicate
further sizable growth in the
third quarter. For purposes of
economic analysis, it is an
advantage to recognize thatthe
moneyavailable for use was
appreciably larger in the third
quarter than in the second
quarter.
Experience of 1972-73
During 1972, it was the respon-
sibility ofthe Federal Reserve
to encourage a rate ofeconomic
expansion adequate to reduce
unemploymentto acceptable
levels. At the same time, despite








These objectives were to some
extent conflicting, and monetary
policy alone could not be
expected to cope with both
problems. Continuation ofan
effective wage-price program
and a firmer policy offiscal
restraint were urgently needed.
The narrowly-defined money
stock increased 7.4 percent
during 1972 (measured from the
fourth quarter of 1971 to the
fourth quarter of 1972.) Between
the third quarter of 1972 and the
third quarterof 1973, the growth
rate was 6.1 percent. By the
first half of1973, the annual
growth rate had declined to 5.8
percent, and a further slowing












ofthese growth rates would
I require full analysis ofthe
$ economic and financial ob-
jectives, conditions, and policies
during the past two years, if not
longer. Such an analysis cannot
be undertaken here. Some
perspective on monetary devel-
opments during 1972-73 may be
gained, however, from compari-
sons with the experience of
other industrial countries, and
by recalling briefly how domestic
economic conditions evolved
duringthis period.
Table 3 compares the growth of
M , in the United States with that
ofother industrial countries in
1972 and the first half of 1973.
The definitions of M, differ
somewhat from country to
country, but are as nearly
comparable as statistical sources
permit. Itgoes without saying
that each country faced its own
set ofeconomic conditions and
problems. Yet it is useful to note
that monetary growth in the
United States was much lower
than in other major industrial
countries, and that it also was
steadier than in the other
\ countries.
Table 3
ANNUAL PERCENT RATES OF
GROWTH IN MONEY SUPPLY
1971.4 1972.4






The next table shows, in sum-
mary fashion, the rates of
change in the money supply
ofthe United States, in its total
production, and in the consumer
price level during 1972 and 1973.
The table is based on the latest
data. It may be noted, in passing,
that, according to data available
as late as January 1973, the rate
ofgrowth of M, during 1972 was
7.2%, not 7.4%; and that the
rate of increase in real GNP was
7.7%, not 7.0%. In other words,
on the basis ofthe data available
during 1972, the rate ofgrowth
ofM, was below the rate of
growth of the physical volume of
over-all production.
The table indicates that growth
in M, during 1972 and 1973
approximately matched the
growth of real output, but was far
below the expansion in the dollar
value of the nation's output.
Although monetary policy
limited the availability of money
relative to the growth of
transactions demands, it still
encouraged a substantial
expansion in economic activity;
real output rose by about 7 per-
cent in 1972. Even so, unemploy-
ment remained unsatisfactorily
high throughout the greater part
ofthe year. Itwas not until
November that the unemploy-
ment rate dropped below 5.5
percent. For the year as a whole,
the unemployment rate averaged
5.6 percent. It may be of interest
to recall that unemployment
averaged5.5 pe rcent in 1954 and
1960, which are commonly
regarded as recession years.
Since the expansion of M 1 in
1972 was low relative to the
demands for money and credit, it
was accompanied byrising short-
term interest rates. Long-term
interest rates showed little net
change last year, as credit
demands were satisfied mainly in
the short-term markets.
11Table 4
MONEY SUPPLY, GNP, AND PRICES IN THE U.S.
(Percent change at annual rates)
The severe rate of inflation that
we have experienced in 1973
cannot responsibly be attributed
to monetary management orto
publicpolicies more generally.
In retrospect, it may well be that
monetary policy should have
been a little less expansive in
1972. But a markedly more
restrictive policy would have led
to a still sharper rise in interest
rates and risked a premature
ending of the business
expansion, without limitingto
any significant degree this year's
upsurge of the price level.
In view of these powerful special
factors, and the cyclical
expansion ofour economy, a
sharp advance in our price level
would have been practically
inevitable in 1973. The upsurge
of the price level this year hardly
represents either the basic trend
of prices orthe response of
prices to previous monetaryor
fiscal policies-whatevertheir
shortcomings may have been. In
particular, as the above tables
show, the explosion of food
prices that occurred this year is
in large part responsible for the









materials. The expansion in
industrial capacity needed to
produce these materials had not
been put in place earlierbecause
ofthe abnormally low level of
profits between 1966 and 1971
and also because of numerous
impediments to new investment
on ecological grounds. Third,
farm product prices escalated
sharply as a result of crop failures
in many countries last year.
Fourth, fuel prices spurted
upward, reflecting the develop-
ing shortages in the energy field.
And fifth, the depreciation ofthe
dollar in foreign exchange
markets has served to boost
prices of imported goods and to












Consumer price index (CPI)
CPI excluding food
The extraordinary upsurge of the
price level this year reflects a
variety ofspecial influences. First,
there has been a world-wide
economic boom superimposed
on the boom in the United States.
Second, we have encountered
critical shortages of basic
In 1973, the growth ofM 1
moderated whilethe transactions
demands for cash and the
turnover of moneyaccelerated.
GNP in current dollars rose at a
12 percent annual rate as prices
rose more rapidly. In credit
markets short-term interest rates
rose sharply further, while long-
term interest rates also moved




The present inflation is the most
serious economic problem facing
our country, and it poses greatdifficulties for economic stabili-
zation policies. We must
recognize, I believe, that it will
take some time for the forces of
inflation, which now engulfour
economy and others around the
world, to burn themselves out. In
today's environment, controls
on wages and prices cannot be
expected to yield the benefits
theydid in 1971 and 1972, when
economic conditions were much
different. Primary reliance in
dealingwith inflation-both in
the near future and over the
longerterm-will have to be
placed on fiscal and monetary
policies.
The prospects for regaining price
stability would be enhanced by
improvements in our monetary
and fiscal instruments. The
conduct of monetary policy
could be improved if steps were
taken to increase the precision
with which the money supplycan
be controlled by the Federal
Reserve. Part ofthe present
control problem stems from
statistical inadequacies-chiefly
the paucity ofdata on deposits
at nonmember banks. Also,
however, control overthe money
supply and other monetary
aggregates is less precise than it
can or should be because non-
member banks are not subject to
the same reserve requirements as
are Federal Reserve members.
I hope that the Congress will
support efforts to rectify these
deficiencies. For its part, the
Federal Reserve Board is even
now carrying on discussions with
the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation aboutthe need for
better statistics on the nation's
moneysupply. The Board also
expects shortlyto recommend to
the Congress legislation that will
put demand deposits at commer-
cial banks on a uniform basis
from the standpoint of reserve
requirements.
Improvements in our fiscal
policies are also needed. It is
important for the Congress to put
an end to fragmented considera-
tion of expenditures, to place a
firm ceiling on total Federal
expenditures, and to relate these
expenditures to prospective
revenues and the nation's
economic needs. Fortunately,
there is now Widespread
recognition by members ofthe
Congress ofthe need to reform
budgetary procedures along
these broad lines.
It also is high time for fiscal
policy to become a more
versatile tool of economic
stabilization. Particularlyap-
propriate would be fiscal
instruments that could be
adapted quickly, under special
legislative rules, to changing
economic conditions-such as a
variable tax credit for business
investment in fixed capital. Once
again I would urge the Congress
to give serious consideration to
this urgently needed reform.
We must strive also for better
understanding of the effects of
economic stabilization policies
on economic activity and prices.
Our knowledge in this area is
greater nowthan it was five or ten
years ago, thanks to extensive
research undertaken by econo-
mists in academic institutions,
at the Federal Reserve, and
elsewhere. The keen interest of
the Joint Economic Committee in
improving economic stabilization
policies has, I believe, been an
influence of great importance in
stimulating this widespread
research effort.
I look forward to continued
cooperation with the Committee
in an effort to achieve the kind
ofeconomic performance our
citizens expect and deserve.
Sincerely yours,
Arthur F. Burns